The Role of the Family in Cadaveric Organ Procurement by Naylor, Chad D.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 65 | Issue 1 Article 8
Winter 1989
The Role of the Family in Cadaveric Organ
Procurement
Chad D. Naylor
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Contracts Commons, Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence
Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Naylor, Chad D. (1989) "The Role of the Family in Cadaveric Organ Procurement," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 65 : Iss. 1 , Article 8.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol65/iss1/8




Until the early 1980s, there were not enough successful organ transplan-
tations to create an organ shortage,' and "[t]he issue of transplantation
remained quiescent for many years." ' 2 With the introduction of new im-
munosuppressive drugs, however, organ transplantation therapy became
much more viable and the demand for organs began to increase.' As a
result, in the United States today, there is an inadequate supply of organs
available for transplant; in fact, for every available organ, there are ap-
proximately three people waiting for transplantation.4
At the same time, there are many more cadavers suitable for use as organ
donors than are currently being used.' The Council of Scientific Affairs
estimates that if all usable organs could be retrieved, there would be few
shortages, if any, in the supply of organs for transplant. 6 From the beginning
of serious transplantation efforts, the problem has been trying to find
ethically and morally acceptable ways to retrieve all usable organs,7 while
at the same time respecting the cadaver donors, their families and other
social values.
The primary social values involved in cadaveric organ procurement include
saving the lives of organ recipients,' protecting the potential donor from
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1. Merz, The Organ Procurement Problem: Many Causes, No Easy Solutions, 254 J.
A.M.A. 3285 (1985).
2. Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues Pertaining to Solid Organ Procurement: A Report of
the Project on Organ Transplantation, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1985, at i [hereinafter
Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues].
3. Merz, supra note 1, at 3285.
4. OFFICE oF ORGAN PROCUREMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUiAN SERVICES, REPORT
oF m TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: IssuEs AND RECOMMENDATIONS 27 (1986)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE].
5. Id. at 35.
6. Council on Scientific Affairs, Organ Donor Recruitment, 246 J. A.M.A. 2157 (1981).
But see TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 34-35 (discussing the difficulty of accurately estimating
the potential cadaveric donor pool).
7. See Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 2, at 9 (discussing the ethical problems
of more efficient alternatives to organ procurement).
8. TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 28.
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what some people believe to be over-zealous organ procurers, 9 respecting
individual autonomy, 0 "[p]romoting a sense of community through acts of
generosity,"" showing respect for the decedent, 12 avoiding aggravating the
grief caused by the sudden death of a loved one, 3 and respecting religious
rights or preferences.' 4 Because several of these social values directly involve
the family, the family of the potential organ donor has traditionally had a
very important role in the procurement of organs. 5
According to common law, the family has certain rights to the remains
of deceased relatives and can control the disposition of the body. 6 While
sometimes limiting the family's role, most modern statutes continue to
recognize some familial rights and require medical examiners and health
officials, where individual consent is absent, to get the family's consent
before removing any organs. 7 Finally, medical practitioners also look to
the family for consent, even when they are not legally required to do so.'
These factors combine to create an important role for the family.
The problem with the familial role in organ procurement arises when the
family becomes an impediment to the efficient procurement of organs.
When this occurs, the goal of saving lives comes into conflict with the goal
of protecting familial interests.' 9 Requiring familial consent can burden
organ procurement in several ways. Doctors hesitate to ask families whether
they want to donate the deceased's organs because the doctors are afraid
of aggravating the families' grief.20 Doctors also fear potential tort litigation
instituted by the family. 2' Finally, families seldom think about organ do-
nation on their own.22 Therefore, under statutes, common law doctrine and
medical practices that require the family's consent, many organs suitable
for transplantation may go unused.
When the family becomes an impediment to the retrieval of organs,
lawmakers must decide whether to eliminate or reduce the family's role in
9. Id. at 38; see also THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, INC., GALLUP SURVEY: TBE U.S.
PUBLIC'S ATTrITUDES TowARD ORGAN TRANSPLANTS/ORoAN DONATION 26 (1985) [hereinafter
GALLUP SURvEY].
10. TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 28.
11. Id.; see also P. RAMSEY, Tim PATIENT AS PERSON 210 (1970).
12. TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 28.
13. Dukeminier & Sanders, Organ Transplantation: A Proposal for Routine Salvaging of
Cadaver Organs, 279 Naw ENG. J. MED. 413, 416 (1968); see also R.G. SnMMONS, S. KLEIN
& R.L. SIMMONS, GIr OF LIFE 338, 355-60 (1977) (discussing the trauma and anguish felt by
the family during the organ procurement process).
14. Dukeminier & Sanders, supra note 13, at 416-17.
15. Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 2, at 9.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., UNIF. ANATOMICAL GnT ACT § 4, 8A U.L.A. 30 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
18. TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 29.
19. See Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 2, at 9.
20. TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 32.
21. Id. at 44.
22. Id. at 32.
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an effort to procure more organs, or to recognize a familial role in order
to protect various social values.23 As organ transplantation therapy becomes
more and more feasible, the demand for organs will increase and the issue
of the family's appropriate role will become even more important.
In order to evaluate what the family's role in cadaveric organ procurement
should be, it is necessary to examine the family's historical role, its modern
role, alternatives to the modern role and the social values involved in
cadaveric organ procurement. Part I of this Note discusses the development
of the family's role in organ procurement (and the disposition of dead
bodies generally) and articulates some of the social values surrounding the
family in the context of death, dying and the disposal of corpses. This
discussion not only helps to explain some of the reasons for the family's
modern role, but also underscores the venerability and magnitude of the
values at stake in the general area of cadavers. Part II examines the family's
modern role in its various forms and alternatives to this role. Finally, Part
III summarizes the relevant social values and evaluates the family's modern
role and its alternatives in light of those values. This Note concludes that
the family should continue to have a prominent and legally recognized role
in cadaveric organ procurement.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY's ROLE
While the phenomenon of organ transplantation is very recent, the values
that surround cadaveric organ procurement are much older and are closely
related to values involving the disposal of cadavers in general. 24 In fact,
some of the first legal requirements for the removal of cadaveric organs
evolved out of the family's rights to dead bodies.25 A brief survey of the
historical development of the family's rights and duties in the context of
dead body disposal is thus necessary to illuminate some of the reasons for
the family's current role in organ procurement.
A. Early Historical Developments
For centuries people have buried, cremated, or otherwise carefully and
respectfully disposed of human remains.26 There is even evidence that the
23. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text for a description of the relevant social
values.
24. Compare supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text with Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U'S. 566,
585 (1829) (affirming an injunction "to preserve the repose of the ashes of the dead, and the
religious sensibilities of the living"); Yome v. Gorman, 242 N.Y. 395, 152 N.E. 126 (1926)
(wishes of the deceased's wife and next of kin are not always the same); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew,
207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (1904) (no universal rule as to burial of the dead, and each case must
consider the public interest, the wishes of the decedent, and the rights and feelings of relatives);
Pierce v. Properties of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227 (1872) (relatives of the deceased
have an enforceable quasi-property right over the body of the deceased).
25. See Dukeminier & Sanders, supra note 13, at 413-15.
26. P. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS AND OF BuRukx AND Bmu AL PLACES 6-18 (2d. ed.
1950).
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Neanderthals provided some sort of funeral services as long ago as 100,000
B.C. 27 Whether for religious reasons, habits of veneration, or moral senti-
ments, the people of various ages and societies have expressed respect for
the sanctity of the remains of the deceased in their methods of disposal. 2
In western societies, the methods of disposal and the rights and duties of
various parties were historically governed by the Christian churches. In fact,
early Christian burial practices became the body of canon law. 29 In England,
the ecclesiastical courts gained control of churchyards and burials by an
ordinance of William the Conqueror. 0 Since the ordinance severed temporal
and spiritual jurisdictions, the Church gained exclusive control over burials,
took bodies "into their actual, corporeal possession," and decided all
disputes involving the possession of bodies or the use of holy places.3'
The Church's exclusive control over dead bodies makes sense in the
context of Christian beliefs. When people believe that the souls of the dead
go to a heaven or a hell and further believe that the dead will be resurrected
with the second coming of the Savior, 32 then the Church would have a
natural interest in controlling dead bodies. What is important in the context
of organ procurement, however, are the values and concepts that the
association between dead bodies and spiritual matters creates. While the
official doctrine of most Christian churches in modern times allows for the
removal of organs for transplant, some people still refuse to donate their
organs in order to keep their bodies intact for a healthy afterlife. 33 Thus,
the historical connection between the Church, religion and the disposition
of dead bodies introduced religious and spiritual values into the area of
cadaveric organ procurement.
During the Church's era of control over the disposition of dead bodies,
it not only infused the area of cadaver disposal with spiritual values, it also
established a framework of laws and practices that exists to the present
day. Under ecclesiastical laws, "[e]very person except the felon, the heretic,
and the suicide was entitled to be buried in the consecrated ground of the
parish churchyard. 3 4 In fact, "by ancient practices under canon law, the
taking of any fee for a burial was prohibited, the right to burial being
one's religious privilege and the necessity of according it a corresponding
27. .M. WEISS & A. MANN, HUMAN BIOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR 380-81 (4th ed. 1985).
28. P. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 5.
29. Id. at 21; see also Sanders & Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis
and Kidney Transplantation, 15 UCLA L. REv. 357, 395-403 (1968).
30. P. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 22.
31. Id. at 23.
32. John 6:44.
33. TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 38.
34. P. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 24.
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duty." 3s Thus, under these laws, people gained some burial rights that were
protected by the Church. 6
Analyzing the early history of cadaver disposal helps to explain the sanctity
of cadaveric remains, the presence of religious and spiritual values in the
organ procurement area and the emergence of the notion that a person has
a right to a proper burial. This analysis also indicates the importance of
the values involved with the disposition of dead bodies by providing evidence
of both the age and universality of these values.
However, since the Church had exclusive control of dead bodies, looking
at this early period does not explain the presence of a familial role in
cadaveric organ procurement. For such an explanation, it is necessary to
look to later historical developments.
B. Early Historical Developments in America
While the ecclesiastical regulations of dead bodies survived in England
until the adoption of the English Burial Acts in the 1850s, 37 they were never
controlling in the United States. Americans "have never considered
[them]selves bound by the ecclesiastical decisions, many of which were
inapplicable to [the American] form of government." 38 Consequently, while
still being influenced by the structure and ideas of ecclesiastical law, the
American courts found a lack of precedent as to who should control the
remains.3 9 To fill the vacuum, the courts decided that the family would
have the duty to provide the burial and a corresponding right to control
the disposition of their relatives' remainsA4
Exactly why the courts gave such rights and duties to the family instead
of some other individual or institution, such as the executor or the courts
themselves, is not entirely clear. However, the early cases seem to be
concerned with the family's emotions and sensibilities. 4' In addition, since
the family members would generally be those people most concerned about
the deceased's remains, they would probably be those most likely to be
35. Id.
36. Later under American law, the family replaced the Church as the protector of the
decedent's "right" to a decent burial. The point is, however, that while a different entity
became the protector of the "right," the "right" persisted into modem times nonetheless. See
infra note 40 and accompanying text.
37. P. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 22.
38. Id. at 26.
39. See id.; see also Cohen v. Congregation Shearith Israel, 99 N.Y.S. 732 (1906), aff'd,
189 N.Y. 528, 82 N.E. 1125 (1907).
40. See Yome, 242 N.Y. at 395, 152 N.E. at 126; Pettigrew, 207 Pa. at 313, 56 A. at 878;
Pierce, 10 R.I. at 227.
41. See Beatty, 27 U.S. at 566; Yome, 242 N.Y. at 395, 152 N.E. at 126; Pettigrew, 207
Pa. at 313, 56 A. at 878; Pierce, 10 R.I. at 227.
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willing to protect the remains and bear the burden of providing for the
burial.
When the courts adjudicated cadaver disposition cases, they articulated
many of the same values that arise today in cadaveric organ procurement.
In 1829, Justice Story of the United States Supreme Court thought that the
Court of Chancery should use its injunctive power "to preserve the repose
of the ashes of the dead, and the religious sensibilities of the living." 42
Later, the highest courts of Rhode Island, 43 New York" and Pennsylvania
articulated the following similar values as worthy of protection: respecting
the wishes of the decedent, the wishes of the decedent's spouse, family and
friends, and protecting public health.
Recognizing such values, the common law courts established an important
role for the family, especially when the wish of the decedent was "casually
or lightly" declared." In some cases the family's wishes could even override
the decedent's own wishes as expressed in his or her will. 47 For example, in
Holland v. Metalious" the deceased had wiled her remains to a university
for medical research. 49 After the university refused to accept the remains,
the family decided to hold funeral services even though the deceased
specifically requested that there be no funeral services. In a dispute between
the family and the executor of the deceased's will, the court found for the
family and allowed the funeral services to be performed.50 Cases such as
Holland indicate the importance of values other than personal autonomy;
courts have recognized the feelings and sensibilities of the living family
members as critically important, even to the point of being dispositive.
Evolving from early ecclesiastical laws where the Church controlled the
disposition of bodies, and religious values predominated in the area, Amer-
ican common law courts established the family as the entity responsible for
the body's disposal. By giving some weight to the deceased's own indications
of preference for the method of disposal, the courts recognized a form of
personal autonomy. However, by allowing the wishes of the family to be
heard and, at times, even override the wishes of the deceased, the courts
recognized and protected the family's decision and sensibilities. Finally,
while no longer allowing the Church to control dead bodies, courts continued
42. Beatty, 27 U.S. at 585.
43. Pierce, 10 R.I. at 227.
44. Yome, 242 N.Y. at 395, 152 N.E. at 126.
45. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. at 313, 56 A. at 878.
46. Yome, 242 N.Y. at 404, 152 N.E. at 129 (dictum).
47. Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 29, at 400; see also infra notes 48-50 and accom-
panying text.
48. 105 N.H. 290, 198 A.2d 654 (1964).
49. Id. at 292, 198 A.2d at 655.
50. Id. at 294, 198 A.2d at 656.
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to give due weight to religious values, especially as they were expressed by
the decedent.5 '
C. Early American Statutes on Organ Procurement
Doctors could not confidently remove organs based on the decedent's
consent alone, because the family played such an important role and because
the questions of whose consent would control were unsettled at common
law.52 In response to this uncertainty and the inadequacy of the number of
organs acquired from family donations, the National Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws formulated the first Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(UAGA) in 1968.11
With the 1968 UAGA and the statutes modeled after it, legislators
attempted to reduce the family's role and use individual consent in order
to procure more organs.54 The first UAGA essentially embodied the doctrine
of "encouraged voluntarism" as developed by Sadler and Sadler.5 5 Using
this doctrine, the Act allowed and encouraged individuals to donate their
organs by signing donor cards.56 Under the Act, if a person completed an
organ donor card before he or she died, then hospitals could use the organs
without infringing on the decedent's autonomy and without encountering
the legal impediments of the traditional common law rights of the family. 7
Accordingly, the Act allowed medical practitioners to remove organs without
familial consent when the individual had completed a donor card. However,
even where the individual had not completed a donor card, the Act allowed
families to donate organs when the deceased had not expressed his or her
wishes. 59
Using such an approach, legislators attempted to promote two important
values in the organ procurement area. They tried to increase the supply of
organs and they sought to protect individual autonomy6 However, by
emphasizing individual consent, the Act sacrificed some of the familial
51. Yome, 242 N.Y. at 402-03, 152 N.E. at 128. Justice Cardozo stated that "[t]he wish
of the deceased, even though legal compulsion may not attach to it, has at least a large
significance. Especially is this so when the wish has its origin in intense religious feeling." Id.
(citations omitted).
52. Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 29, at 395, 402.
53. Caplan, Organ Transplants: The Costs of Success, 13 HASTINGS CENTER RP., Dec.
1983, at 23; see also UNi'. ANATOMCAL GrT ACT (1968) (amended 1987).
54. Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 2, at 9.
55. Sadler, Sadler, Stason & Stickel, Transplantation: A Case for Consent, 280 NEw ENG.
J. MEr. 862 (1969); see also Sadler, Sadler & Stason, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 206
J. A.M.A. 2501 (1968).
56. UNiP. ANATOMICAL GIFrT ACT § 4 (1968) (amended 1987).
57. Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 2, at 9.
58. UNiP. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4 (1968) (amended 1987).
59. Id. at § 2.
60. Sadler, Sadler, Stason & Stickel, supra note 55, at 862.
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values recognized by the common law.6' Even if the individual had con-
sented, taking the organs without the family's consent might aggravate the
family's grief. In addition, allowing the individual to determine the dispo-
sition of his or her own remains conflicted with the notion that the family's
will could sometimes take precedence over the individual's wishes.62
For various reasons, the UAGA of 1968 failed to work as planned. Only
seventeen percent of the people surveyed by Gallup in 1985 had signed a
donor card.63 People indicated that their fear of doctors hastening their
death to get their organs, distaste for thinking about death, religious
objections and other concerns influenced their decision not to sign donor
cards. 64 In addition, even when people had signed donor cards, doctors and
procurement agencies were reluctant to use the organs without the family's
consent. 6 In this instance, the medical profession seemed to be more
concerned about the family's grief and the family's right to make the final
determination than was the early UAGA. Thus, one of the reasons for the
UAGA's failure appears to be its disregard for those social values surround-
ing the family. Regardless of the reason for the UAGA's failure, its failure
caused many people to call for reforms of organ procurement laws. With
the introduction of these reforms and the greater need for organs, the
family's modern role in cadaveric organ procurement began to develop.
II. MODERN ROLE OF THE FAMILY AND ALTERNATIVES
In response to both the values surrounding cadaveric organ procurement
and the historical development of the family's role, the courts, legislative
bodies and the medical profession all established laws, rules and practices
that make up the family's modern role.
A. Court Actions
While legislative acts have reduced the importance of the courts for
determining the family's role in organ procurement,6 the courts continue
to help define the family's role in two ways. First, where events surrounding
organ donations fall outside the scope of a statute, the family's common
law rights to control the disposition of a relative's body re-emerge. 67 Second,
61. See P. RAMEY, supra note 11, at 199-200.
62. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
63. GALLup SuRvEy, supra note 9, at 19.
64. Id. at 26.
65. TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 29.
66. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
67. See Kirker v. Orange County, 519 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. App. 1988); Strachan v. John
F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 109 N.J. 523, 538 A.2d 346 (1988).
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courts decide whether the family has any constitutionally protected rights
to the decedent's remains.
1. Common Law Rights
Under the common law, a family has a quasi-property right in the remains
of its deceased relatives. 6 Accordingly, the courts will enforce the family's
right to have the body for burial "in the condition found when life became
extinct."' 69 Any infringement of this right may be redressed by an action in
damages. 70 While this right has been called a quasi-property right, most
modem courts and commentators conclude that it has nothing to do with
property. Instead, it "is something evolved out of thin air to meet the
occasion, and.., in reality the personal feelings of the survivors are being
protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer." ' 7' Even
though the family's right to the corpse is now explicitly based on protection
from mental distress rather than quasi-property rights, 72 courts continue to
protect the right. 73
Modem organ procurement statutes modeled after the UAGA limit the
family's common law rights to the decedent's remains. Section 11 of the
UAGA states, "A hospital, [or] physician, . . . who acts in accordance with
this [Act] ... or attempts in good faith to do so is not liable for that act
in a civil or criminal proceeding." 74 While section 11 provides protection
to doctors and hospitals in most instances, there still exists the possibility
that someone could face civil liabilities arising from the family's common
law rights.
By definition, if someone does not act in accordance with the UAGA or
make a good faith effort to do so, he or she would not be protected by
section 11.7 For example, a doctor could remove an organ without making
a good faith effort to obtain consent as required by sections 4 and 11.76
Since the doctor would have infringed upon the family's right to have the
68. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227 (1872); see also Fuller v.
Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984); Strachan, 109 N.J. at 531, 538 A.2d at 350.
69. Kirker, 519 So. 2d at 684; see also Strachan, 109 N.J. at 531, 538 A.2d at 350.
70. Strachan, 109 N.J. at 531, 538 A.2d at 350 (quoting Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery
Co., 117 N.J.L. 90, 93, 186 A. 585 (1936)).
71. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON Tm LAW OF
ToRTs § 12 at 63 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; see also Strachan, 109 N.J.
at 531, 538 A.2d at 350; State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1192 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1089 (1986).
72. Strachan, 109 N.J. at 531, 538 A.2d at 350.
73. See id.; see also Kirker, 519 So. 2d at 682.
74. UNm. ANATOMCtAL GwT AcT § 11 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
75. Id.
76. UNI. ANAToMIcAL GIFT ACT §§ 4, 11 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
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body "in the condition found when life became extinct," 77 the doctor would
be liable under the common law.
Just such a case occurred recently in Florida. A medical examiner removed
the eyes and corneas of a deceased infant after the mother had expressly
objected to the procedure. 7 The court held that the immunity provision in
the state's organ procurement statute did not apply to the defendant's
actions because the mother had expressly objected to the procedures. 79 Thus,
when the action of removing organs is beyond the scope of the organ
procurement statute or when the removal is not performed in good faith,
the family's common law right to the remains of their deceased relatives
can re-emerge.
The re-emergence of the family's right in these situations creates a
"watchdog" role for the family. Since they have the power to sue medical
practitioners for non-compliance with the statute, families ensure that those
dealing with corpses will comply with the appropriate statutory provisions.
By creating such a right for the family, courts not only recognize the
family's own interests in controlling the deceased's remains (e.g., avoiding
aggravation of the family's grief), they also make the family the primary
mechanism for protecting both the donor's interests (safety and autonomy)
and society's interests (e.g., decent burials). 0
2. Constitutional Rights
As interpreted to date, the family has no constitutional right to control
the disposition of its relative's remains. 81 When arguing for such rights,
plaintiffs and commentators typically assert constitutional rights to property,
privacy or religious freedom. 2
The Georgia Supreme Court, in Georgia Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant,s3 has
stated that there is no property right to the remains of a deceased's body.
Neither the United States Constitution, nor the common law predating the
Constitution recognizes any sort of property right in corpses.8 Instead, the
quasi-property right recognized at common law is simply court-made doc-
77. Kirker, 519 So. 2d at 684.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 2, at 2 for an indication of the use
of informed consent as a mechanism for protecting various social values.
81. The United States Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, but see Powell, 497
So. 2d at 1188; Georgia Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 255 Ga. 60, 335 S.E.2d 127 (1985).
82. See Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1192-93; Lavant, 255 Ga. at 60, 335 S.E.2d at 127; see also
Johnson, Sale of Human Organs: Implicating A Privacy Right, 21 VAL. U.L. REv. 741 (1987);
Merriken & Overcast, Governmental Regulation of Heart Transplantation and the Right to
Privacy, 11 J. CONrTEMP. L. 481 (1985).
83. 255 Ga. at 60, 335 S.E.2d at 127.
84. Id. at 61, 335 S.E.2d at 128.
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trine that seeks to assuage the family's emotional grief. 85 Accordingly, so-
called property rights do not impose any sort of limitation on the legislature
when it enacts laws concerning the disposition of corpses, including organ
removal.86
While the Lavant court discusses the legislature's important purpose in
creating organ procurement statutes, 87 and thereby implies a balancing test,
there is really no need for any balancing. Since the family never had any
real property rights in the corpse, organ procurement statutes take nothing
actually belonging to the family. This is so even where the statutes allow
for the removal of organs without consent. Consequently, no matter what
the legislature's purpose for creating the statute, a court-made quasi-property
right should in no way limit the legislature's actions. Justice Weltner, writing
for the majority in Lavant, echoes this argument: "A person has no
property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law ... [therefore]
the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will, or even at
the whim, of the legislature . "..."88
One year after Lavant, the Florida Supreme Court rejected a similar
claim to a constitutionally protected property right in corpses.8 9 The court
also distinguished constitutional rights to privacy, stating that right to
privacy cases all involve relationships among living persons.9 Since the
removal of organs from cadavers occurs only after the donor is dead, there
is no relationship among living persons. 9' Once again, under this analysis,
the legislature is free to enact organ procurement statutes for any reason
whatsoever.
The only constitutionally-based challenge to organ procurement statutes
left open by the courts is a first amendment religious objection. The Powell
court acknowledged this argument, but left the question open since the
plaintiff failed to raise it.92 This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this
Note because no court has ruled on the challenge and the issue involves
speculation.
As mentioned above, the courts do influence and enhance the family's
role in the organ procurement area. In the absence of relevant statutory
prohibitions, the courts still allow family members to recover for their
emotional pain and suffering. 93 By doing so, the courts implicitly recognize
those social values that respect the family's emotions in reaction to death
85. Id.
86. Id. at 61-62, 355 S.E.2d at 128-29.
87. Id. at 62, 355 S.E.2d at 129.
88. Id. at 61, 355 S.E.2d at 128 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)).




93. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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and dying. In addition, the courts establish the family as the primary
mechanism for protecting various social values. While these judicial decisions
are relevant to any analysis of the family's role in cadaveric organ pro-
curement, the courts do not define the essence of the family's modem role.
Since the courts have refused to recognize any constitutional rights in the
area of organ procurement and every state legislature has enacted relevant
statutes, 94 legislatures are more important in defining the modem family
role in organ procurement.
B. Legislative Actions
Modern organ procurement statutes typically try to respond to the 1968
UAGA's failure to procure sufficient organs to meet the demand. 9 In doing
so, the statutes follow one of two approaches. In most cases, legislators
attempt to procure more organs by increasing the role of familial consent.
However, legislators sometimes try to procure organs by reducing both the
individual's and the family's role.
1. "Required Request"
In 1983 and 1984, Arthur Caplan argued strenuously for reform of
donation laws. 96 He contended that, in order to take advantage of the
willingness of families to donate their relatives' organs, society needed laws
requiring that someone in hospitals ask families for the organs.7 Caplan
argued that these laws would compensate for the public's reluctance to fill
out donor cards and the doctors' reluctance to ask families for donations.98
He compared organ donations to blood donations and concluded that
"requests" were needed to stimulate altruism.9
"Required request" laws take a variety of forms. Typically, however,
they either force hospitals to inform the "appropriate parties" of the
opportunity to give organs, or they require that hospitals actually ask for
organs whenever the cadaver is in suitable condition.10 These laws have a
94. UrN. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT (1987 & Supp. 1989).
95. Caplan, supra note 53, at 24; see also UNIT. ANATOMCAL GIrT ACT (1987 & Supp.
1989); TASK FORCE, supra note 4.
96. Caplan, supra note 53; Caplan, Organ Procurement: It's Not in the Cards, 14 HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Oct. 1984, at 9 [hereinafter Organ Procurement].
97. Organ Procurement, supra note 96, at 12.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., UNI. ANATOICAL Gwr ACT § 5 (1987 & Supp. 1989); see also TASK FORCE,
supra note 4, at 31-34.
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great impact on the role of the family because the family is usually the
"appropriate party." 101
As the shortages of organs continued to grow under the old laws, the
federal government passed the National Organ Transplant Act establishing
the Task Force on Organ Transplantation.0 2 After a detailed study, the
Task Force strongly recommended that "required request" policies and
statutes be adopted on both state and federal levels. 03
Recognizing the failure of the 1968 UAGA, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws reacted by amending the UAGA in
1987.0 4 While in form the amended Act appears to preserve the 1968
UAGA's preference for individual consent, in practice it elevates the family's
role to that of the primary agent of consent.
The Act does retain those provisions that allow people to donate their
organs before they die by filling out organ donation cards. 05 However,
when enacting the amendments, the commissioners were aware of the
problems with voluntary organ donation. Specifically, they knew that few
people signed organ donor cards and that, even when the cards were signed
and available, doctors would not retrieve the organs without the additional
consent of a family member.1 6 Accordingly, the commissioners must have
realized that simply continuing to allow voluntary individual donations
would do little to increase the supply of organs. Therefore, the provisions
relating to familial consent and "required request" are the essence of the
amended Act.
Section 3 of the 1987 UAGA"07 establishes the family's role by allowing
family members to donate the organs of deceased relatives. It also establishes
a hierarchy Within the family, thereby increasing the efficiency of the familial
consent mechanism by indicating levels of authority in case of disagreement
among family members. 08 Section 3, however, is relatively unchanged from
the 1968 version of the Act.3 9 More important to the family's role is the
101. In cadaveric organ procurement, the patient is by definition dead. In addition, many
cadaver donors died suddenly, so that the hospital would never have a chance to ask the organ
donor about donation. R.G. SwmMONS, S. KaInnN & R.L. SIMMONS, supra note 13, at 339-42.
Therefore, the family will often be the only available party from whom consent can be
acquired.
102. TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 1; National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507,
98 Stat. 2339 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 273-274 (Supp. 1987)).
103. Id. at 31-34. Over the last couple of years a majority of states have adopted "required
request" or similar statutes. Martyn, Wright & Clark, Required Request for Organ Donation:
Moral, Clinical and Legal Problems, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr.-May 1988, at 27, 33
n.2.
104. UNTF. ANATOMacAL G=-r AcT (prefatory note) (1987 & Supp. 1989).
105. Id. at § 2.
106. Id. at prefatory note.
107. Id. at § 3.
108. Id.
109. UNIT. ANATOMCAL Grm ACT § 2 (1968) (amended 1987).
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addition of Section 5: "Routine Inquiry and Required Request, Search and
Notification.'"10
Section 5 requires that a representative of the hospital discuss the option
of making an anatomical gift with the patient while alive or with the family
at the time of death."' As a practical matter, the addition of section 5
places the family at the forefront of the procurement effort. Since the dying
or deceased individual is usually unable to talk to hospital representatives," 2
the family becomes the practical focus of the "routine inquiry" or "required
requests."" 3 Accordingly, "required request" laws at least maintain and
will probably increase the family's role in cadaveric organ procurement.
2. "Presumed Consent"
A few states have enacted "presumed consent" laws." 4 These statutes
presume that dying individuals would consent to organ donation if they had
the opportunity." 5 Pursuant to this presumption, these statutes typically
allow medical examiners to remove organs without giving notice or obtaining
anyone's consent." 6 Under this scheme, the burden for objecting to organ
donation rests on the individual before death or on the family. Since there
is no notice requirement, families are sometimes unaware that organ removal
will occur and have no real opportunity to refuse." 7
Using presumptions of consent, "presumed consent" laws attempt to
reduce both the individual's and the family's roles in order to maximize the
number of organs retrieved. 8 Overall, however, these laws are not very
important in the United States. They exist in only a few states and typically
apply only to such organs as corneas." 9 "Presumed consent" does, however,
provide an important model of reform.
In 1968, when the policies of "encouraged voluntarism" were adopted
by the UAGA, the most significant alternative model was "presumed
consent."' 20 As recently as 1983, Arthur Caplan supported "presumed
consent" as a method of addressing the failures of the 1968 UAGA. 2 1
110. Urn'. ANATOMICAL GnT ACT § 5 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
111. Id.
112. R.G. SIMMONS, S. KLEIN & R.L. SIMONS, supra note 13, at 339-42.
113. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
114. Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 2, at 20.
115. Dukeminier & Sanders, supra note 13, at 418; see also Lavant, 255 Ga. at 60, 355
S.E.2d at 128.
116. Dukeminier & Sanders, supra note 13, at 418; see also Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1193.
117. Lavant, 255 Ga. at 60, 355 S.E.2d at 128.
118. See Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 29, at 395-403; see also Caplan, supra note 53,
at 27-28.
119. Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 2, at 20.
120. Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 29, at 410-13; see also Caplan, supra note 53, at
23.
121. Caplan, supra note 53, at 27-32.
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While this model has now been overshadowed by the "required request"
model,'2 legislators may be tempted to adopt "presumed consent" statutes
and to eliminate the family's role entirely should current reforms fail to
produce a sufficient supply of organs.'2
C. Medical Profession
While legislators try to define the family's precise role with statutory
provisions, the medical profession often refuses to follow the applicable
laws. By doing so, doctors create a role for the family that may differ from
the theoretical legal role. Both the 1968 and 1987 UAGAs allow doctors to
remove organs with the donor's consent alone. For example, section 2(h)
of the 1987 UAGA provides that "lain anatomical gift that is not revoked
by the donor before death is irrevocable and does not require the consent
or concurrence of any person after the donor's death."' 4 In addition,
doctors are immune from civil and criminal liability to the extent that they
comply with the statute.'2 However, doctors and organ procurement agen-
cies rarely attempt to remove organs without first obtaining the consent of
the deceased's family, even when the deceased has signed an organ donor
card. 12
This phenomenon also occurs in countries that have adopted "presumed
consent" laws. 27 In France, for example, where doctors do not even need
a signed donor card in order to remove organs,'2 "French physicians find
it psychologically intolerable to remove tissues from a body without obtain-
ing the permission of next-of-kin.' ' 29
Several reasons exist to explain this reluctance. First, as previously indi-
cated, there seems to be a psychological unwillingness on the part of doctors
to remove organs without the family's consent. Second, organ procurement
agencies and hospitals are naturally hesitant to become embroiled in disputes
and litigation about their rights to take organs since they rely on the public's
good will for support. Finally, as suggested by Caplan, "[p]hysician non-
compliance appears to be primarily a result of the resentment held by
122. The National Task Force on Organ Transplantation, for instance, has recommended
"required request" legislation. TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 31-34. In addition, several states
have already adopted "required request" laws. See supra note 102.
123. Caplan indicates the possibility of failure when he alludes to the reluctance of physicians
to conform to the new "required request" laws. Caplan, Professional Arrogance and Public
Misunderstanding, 18 HAsTINGS CENTER REP., Apr.-May 1988, at 34-35.
124. UNwn. ANATOmCAL Gir ACT § 2(h) (1987 & Supp. 1989).
125. Id. at § 11.
126. TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 29.
127. Organ Procurement, supra note 96, at 10-I1.




physicians against nonphysicians, most specifically legislators and bureau-
crats, about being told what they must do."' 130
Through their attitudes and practices, doctors can significantly affect the
family's role. When legislators adopted the "encouraged voluntarism" ap-
proach of the 1968 UAGA, they intended to reduce the family's role and
encourage organ donations by looking to the individual for consent.'
Doctors, however, resisted the change and continued to require familial
consent. Consequently, doctors ensured the continuance of the family's
traditional role as developed by the courts. 32 Since legislators are now
beginning to re-emphasize the family's role by adopting "required request"
laws, the family's legal role will again correspond to its practical role as
_preserved by doctors. 3 3 However, should legislators attempt to reduce the
family's role by enacting "presumed consent" laws, they will find a signif-
icant barrier in the medical profession's unwillingness to comply.
III. EVALUATION OF THE FAMILY'S ROLE
In order to evaluate the family's proper role in cadaveric organ procure-
ment, it is necessary to articulate the primary values surrounding organ
procurement, death, dying and the disposition of dead bodies.
A. Value of Organ Transplants for Saving Lives and Improving
Health
Improving health, enhancing comfort and preserving life are some of our
society's most important values. These values motivate people to spend vast
amounts of time and resources to procure and transplant organs. 34 Duke-
minier and Sanders state that "[slaving life is a central ethical principle of
medicine, law and religion. Applied to homotransplantation, this principle
means that cadaver organs should be used to save the life of some living
person."' 35
While the concept of saving lives and improving health through organ
transplantation seems very noble, our society may not be as committed to
this type of medical procedure as Dukeminier and Sanders suggest. Certain
130. Caplan, supra note 123, at 35 (referring to physician noncompliance with "required
request" laws).
131. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
133. But see Caplan, supra note 123, at 35 (indicating that doctors are not completely
complying with "required request" laws).
134. TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 28. For a particularly poignant illustration of the
emotional force of these values, see Squadron, Two Lives on Hold, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19,
1988, (Magazine) at 39 (describing the turmoil of a couple waiting for an organ donation).
135. Dukeminier & Sanders, supra note 13, at 416.
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portions of society, especially older generations, sometimes believe that what
a person receives in the form of original organs is fate. 3 6 Accordingly,
some people view the opportunity to obtain a transplanted organ as a matter
of luck for which society should not spend vast resources. The great majority
of Americans, however, support organ transplantation, and even consider
it praiseworthy. 3 7 In addition, as the feasibility of organ transplantation
improves and the frequency of the procedure increases, it is plausible that
societal acceptance will improve.
Even if society values organ transplantation as a means of prolonging
life and improving health, people must still decide whether they are willing
to bear the extraordinarily high costs of this medical procedure. Martyn,
Wright and Clark estimate that the average kidney transplantation costs
$30,000, heart transplantation, $110,000 and liver transplantation, $240,000.138
In 1986, the federal government alone spent two billion dollars on dialysis
and kidney transplantations through its End Stage Renal Disease program. 139
If the federal government decides to adopt the recommendations of the
National Task Force on Organ Transplantation and assume the costs of
liver and heart transplantations,140 the costs of transplantation therapy to
the government will be much higher. 4 1
Martyn, Wright and Clark argue that "[i]t is an inescapable fact that we
do not have an unlimited ability to pay for any and all health care. Our
health care budget has limits . . . . ,42 The reality of this conclusion is
illustrated by the recent decisions of some states to refrain from developing
"formal policies regarding payment for heart and liver transplants ... in
the absence of more definitive information regarding long-term costs.' 1 43
In France (where organ transplantation therapy has been encouraged through
"presumed consent" laws), doctors and nurses recognize the high costs of
organ transplantation: "Given the growing concern in France over the rising
costs of health care there is a reluctance to devote scarce medical resources
to organ procurement.'" 44
136. Surveys indicate "that older persons are less positive toward organ transplantation and
toward nontraditional methods of handling death .... One respondent said, 'My mother had
absolute fits. She is extremely religious and she feels you are given one set of organs and if
something goes wrong with them, that's it."' R.G. SEMMONS, S. KiaN & R.L. SnmwONS, supra
note 13, at 346.
137. TASKc FORCE, supra note 4, at 37-38; see also GALLUP SUv , supra note 9, at 23 ("A
high proportion (74%) of the respondents disagree with the statement that it is wrong to
prolong life through the use of human transplants, but one in four have some reservations.").
138. Martyn, Wright & Clark, supra note 103, at 30-31.
139. Id. at 34 n.28 (The End Stage Renal Disease program is a medicare program designed
to pay for the costs of dialysis and kidney transplantations.).
140. TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 105.
141. Martyn, Wright & Clark, supra note 103, at 31. Compare TASK FORCE, supra note 4,
at 105, 225-27 (indicating much lower costs than those estimated by Martyn, Wright & Clark).
142. Martyn, Wright & Clark, supra note 103, at 30.
143. TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 100.
144. Caplan, supra note 96, at 11.
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The implication of this cost analysis is that our society will have to
sacrifice other important medical procedures if it pursues organ transplan-
tation. Therefore, legislators should first determine the total number of
organs they will attempt to procure before they decide the extent of the
family's role in individual cases. If legislators decide that health care dollars
are better spent on other medical procedures, then it will no longer be
necessary to enlist the family in an attempt to procure more organs. The
relative value of organ procurement is open to debate; however, this Note's
scope is not broad enough to allow for a detailed analysis of the ultimate
worth of devoting vast medical resources to organ transplantation.
145
B. The Family as an Impediment to Organ Procurement
Even assuming that society is willing to bear the cost of transplantations,
there is no reason to eliminate the family's role unless the family significantly
interferes with the procurement of organs. In the past, commentators have
argued that the family does become an obstacle to organ retrieval when
laws require familial consent. 146 This can occur in two ways. First, the
family's exercise of its right to refuse a donation will preclude the retrieval
of an organ. Second, the family will not often think of donating on its
own. 147
Concededly, no doctor or organ procurement agency will take organs
from a deceased individual if the family vetoes the decedent's organ do-
nation. 14 Accordingly, frequent familial denials would result in fewer avail-
able organs. However, a 1985 Gallup Survey indicates that "a substantial
majority (71%) of those aware of organ transplants say they are very likely
to give permission to have the organs of a loved one donated after that
person's death.' 1 49 An additional 14% indicate that they are "[s]omewhat
[1]ikely" to give permission. 50 Given these findings, it is unlikely that the
family's ability to deny organ removal significantly impedes procurement.
The family's willingness notwithstanding, it is common for families to
forget about the organ donation option when they are beset with grief.'5'
145. See Martyn, Wright & Clark, supra note 103, at 31.
[I]t is plausible to assume that increased costs in one area of the health care
budget will have an impact on overall expenditures for health care. The voiceless
and under-represented groups in our society, the poor, racial minorities, and the
elderly, are most likely to suffer the burden of cutbacks in the provision of other
forms of health care.
Id.
146. See Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 29, at 395, 399; see also Ethical, Legal and
Policy Issues, supra note 2, at 9.
147. TAsK FORCE, supra note 4, at 31-32.
148. Id. at 29.
149. GALuLu Suavwy, supra note 9, at 12.
150. Id.
151. TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 32.
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Compounding this problem is doctors' reluctance to approach families about
donations.1 12 Doctors believe that asking family members to donate will
cause them to experience more stress. 51 In addition, doctors sometimes feel
that they have failed the family by letting the patient die, and are thus
reluctant to ask anything of the family. 54
However, switching to a system of "presumed consent" will not greatly
increase the supply of organs. As reported by some, "presumed consent"
laws do help to increase the supply of organs; they do not, however,
completely solve the problem.155 In countries that have adopted "presumed
consent" laws, waiting lists for organs remain. 5 6 Doctors in France still
seek familial approval of organ removal, even though the law allows them
to remove organs without anyone's consent. 5 7 In this country, doctors are
reluctant to remove organs without familial consent even when the donor
has filled out an organ donor card. 5 This reluctance suggests that doctors
would continue to seek familial consent even if "presumed consent" laws
became widespread in the United States.
Since physicians are the primary obstacle to efficient organ procurement,
legislators should focus on the role and activities of medical practitioners. 5 9
For example, more professional education concerning death and dying
situations should reduce doctors' reluctance to discuss organ donation with
grieving families.26 In addition, restructuring the role of the medical pro-
fession, as opposed to attempting to reduce the family's role, will not
infringe on those social values that dictate familial involvement in organ
procurement. 6'
C. Values Involving the Family and Cadaver Donors
Assuming, arguendo, that society values organ transplantation, that so-
ciety is willing to bear the costs of this procedure, and that the family is
an actual impediment to organ procurement, several reasons exist for
maintaining the family's role in cadaveric organ procurement. Most impor-
152. Id. at 44.
153. "Physicians and nurses may be reluctant to discuss organ donation with potential
donor families, fearing that this will cause the families more stress." Id. (citation omitted).
154. Id.




158. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
159. See Caplan, supra note 123, at 37 (recommending education for health care professionals
about their duties concerning organ and tissue procurement).
160. See Sadier & Sadier, A Community of Givers, Not Takers, 14 HAsTINGs CENTER RP.,
Oct. 1984, at 6, 8-9; see also Caplan, supra note 123, at 34.
161. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
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tantly, several social values necessitate familial involvement. These values
include protecting the potential donor from what some people believe to be
over-zealous organ procurers, respecting individual autonomy, "promoting
a sense of community through acts of generosity," showing respect for the
decedent, avoiding the aggravation of the grief caused by the sudden death
of a loved one, and respecting religious rights or preferences. 16 2 These values
involve the family in three discrete ways. The family's consent can be used
as a mechanism to protect social values; the family's consent can be used
to promote community; and the family is important in its own right.
1. Familial Consent Mechanism
Familial consent is used as a mechanism to protect the donor's autonomy
before and after death. 163 Justified or not, many people fear that a doctor
will falsely pronounce them dead in order to get their organs.' 64 One way
to protect people from such an event, or at least to address their fears, is
to require familial consent for organ donations. Assuming that family
members care about their dying relatives, they would be the ones most
likely to try to protect the donor from over-zealous doctors. Society could
look to the courts to protect these donors by requiring courts to make a
declaration of death before any organ removals were allowed; however, the
severe time limitations on organ procurement require someone who can be
at the hospital immediately. 65 In addition, requiring court supervision would
further encumber the legal system.
A requirement of familial consent can also protect the donor's auton-
omy.'" To a great extent, society would like to recognize an individual's
own wishes regarding his or her remains. 167 As recognized by the first
UAGA of 1968,168 the best way to protect this value is to obtain the
individual's consent before death. However, some commentators consider
the 1968 UAGA's approach a failure because (1) few people fill out donor
cards, (2) the cards are not used by hospitals and (3) the number of organs
retrieved under state statutes based on the 1968 UAGA is insufficient. 69
162. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
163. See Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 2, at 2 ("Informed consent is the
primary mechanism for protecting the dignity and autonomy of both donors and their families
in making organ donations.").
164. See GALUuP SURvEY, supra note 9, at 26 (Twenty-three percent of those surveyed
indicated that a fear of doctors doing something to them before they were really dead was a
very important reason for not wanting to give permission for their own organs to be donated.).
165. See Caplan, supra note 53, at 26-27 (describing the distribution of organs and the time
constraints inherent in that process).
166. See Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 2, at 2.
167. TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 28; see also Dukeminier & Sanders, supra note 13, at
416.
168. Usrr. ANATOMICAL GnaT ACT (1968) (amended 1987).
169. Caplan, supra note 53, at 24.
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Consequently, barring a total ban on the use of cadaveric organs, the only
way to protect the donor's autonomy is to develop some form of substituted
consent; familial consent is one such form and is used by both the old
UAGA and more modem procurement statutes.1 70
Familial consent is, after individual consent, the best mechanism for
protecting individual autonomy. Family members probably know the de-
ceased's wishes concerning organ donation better than anyone.1 7' If the
family does not know, the deceased would probably prefer that the family
decide rather than some unknown doctor, bureaucrat or judge. 172 Finally,
the only real alternative to familial consent is "presumed consent," which
does not protect individual autonomy as well as familial consent.
Under "presumed consent" laws, doctors can simply take organs as
needed.'7 Therefore, this substantially undermines individual autonomy.'7 4
The Gallup survey indicates that a significant portion of the American
public objects to doctors removing organs without first obtaining consent.7 5
In order to protect the autonomy of this group, a "presumed consent" law
must create some way for individuals to register their objections. 76 However,
it would be nearly impossible to create such a mechanism that could respond
to the strict time limitations of organ removal situations. 7 7 Thus, familial
consent is the only viable mechanism for protecting individual autonomy.
2. Familial Consent and the Community
Requiring some form of consent in the organ procurement process can
also promote a sense of community. 78s As Paul Ramsey states, "A society
will be a better human community in which giving and receiving is the rule,
not taking for the sake of good to come.' 1 79 Since would-be donors do not
170. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GI=r ACT (1968); UNIT. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT (1987).
171. GALLUP SuRvEy, supra note 9, at 18 (indicating that those people who are likely to
donate tell family members of their intentions concerning donation more often than they tell
others).
172. See id. Why would people tell family members of their intentions to donate more often
than others if they did not want the family involved in the donation process? In light of the
public's reluctance to fill out donor cards, it is plausible that the act of telling family members
shows the individual's willingness to have the family decide.
173. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
174. For the advocated advantages of the "presumed consent" approach, see supra notes
114-17, 155 and accompanying text. However, there are other arguments that the "presumed
consent" advantages are illusory. But see supra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
175. While 62% of those surveyed by Gallup "would not mind if, upon death, their organs
were donated even if they had never given permission," that still leaves up to 38% who would
mind. GALiup SuRvEY, supra note 9, at 23.
176. Sadler & Sadler, supra note 160, at 8.
177. Id.
178. P. RAMSEY, supra note 11, at 210.
179. Id.
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or are unable to consent to donation, the only means left for promoting
community in organ donation is to ask the family to consent to the donation.
3. The Family in its Own Right
Finally, social values necessitate familial involvement in order to protect
the family members themselves. When organ donation opportunities arise,
the family will be in great emotional distress. This is especially true because
most people leaving bodies suitable for organ donation died unexpectedly. 80
In such circumstances, "[slalvaging cadaver organs should be done in such
a way as to minimize the traumatic effect of the practice on the bereaved
relatives."'' Giving family members a consenting role will alleviate their
grief and provide a means of protecting their sensibilities and emotions.'1
D. Informed Consent
One of the main reasons for including family members in the organ
procurement process is to obtain their informed consent.8 3 With such
consent, the family can serve as a mechanism for protecting the donor
while alive, protecting the donor's autonomy, and for promoting community
through generosity.8 4 However, if the consent is not truly informed, then
the mechanism will fail to protect those values.
Two basic factors can undermine the validity of the family's consent in
cadaveric organ procurement: (1) psychological pressures inherent in the
organ procurement area and (2) over-aggressive organ procurement efforts.8 5
In the wake of death, the potential donor's family faces significant psycho-
logical burdens.' "It is difficult for the survivors to cease thinking of a
body as a person-to whom they have strong emotional ties ... and to
think of the body as a cadaver."'8 7 Martyn, Wright and Clark argue that
these circumstances make the family vulnerable to undue influence and
manipulation. 8  These authors further contend that the family cannot be
expected to understand the information provided about organ donation at
180. R.G. SIMMONS, S. KLEIN & R.L. SMMONS, supra note 13, at 339-40.
181. Dukeminier & Sanders, supra note 13, at 416.
182. See, e.g., Kirker v. Orange County, 519 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. App. 1988) (The fact
that the mother sued when her objections to the organ removal were ignored tends to indicate
increased aggravation of grief when family members cannot control the disposition of their
loved-ones' remains.).
183. Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 2, at 2.
184. See supra notes 163-79 and accompanying text.
185. Caplan, supra note 53, at 25-27; see also Martyn, Wright & Clark, supra note 102, at
29-30.
186. Martyn, Wright & Clark, supra note 103, at 29.
187. Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 29, at 359.
188. Martyn, Wright & Clark, supra note 103, at 29.
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this time.1 9 Thus, any "consent" would not be informed in a true sense.
However, Martyn, Wright and Clark offer no evidence, either statistical
or anecdotal, of any actual incidence of manipulation or uninformed con-
sent. 90 In contrast, Simmons, Klein and Simmons undertook a study of
families who had donated the organs of deceased relatives and found little
or no evidence of coercion or uninformed consent. 91
In fact, they found that most of their subjects were able to make rational
decisions and felt positive about making the donation, even as much as one
year later. 92 The Task Force on Organ Transplantation confirms the Sim-
mons' findings, stating, "[o]rgan donation and tissue donation is [sic] almost
always a profound source of consolation to the families of patients suffering
unexpected and premature death."' 93
While families do face difficult circumstances when they decide whether
to donate a cadaveric organ, their consent appears to be well-informed and
volitional. With such consent, families provide the best available mechanism
for protecting the essential values of organ donation while, at the same
time, allowing for efficient organ procurement.
CONCLUSION
As transplantation therapy becomes more refined and successful, reform-
ers and legislators may be tempted to reduce the role of the family. In
other countries and in some portions of the United States, these attempts
have taken the form of "presumed consent" laws. The advantages of these
laws, however, are illusory and the risks to other social values are enormous.
"Presumed consent" laws ignore those values served by the family's his-
torical role in the disposition of dead bodies. These laws also impair the
family's ability to protect the donor while alive and the donor's autonomy
generally. The family's traditional role in organ procurement is a role that
is finely tuned to both its own needs and the needs of donors. The need
for more organs does not justify the losses that would result if the family's
role were significantly reduced. Therefore, lawmakers should focus on the
role of medical practitioners and attempt to increase the number of available
organs by requiring proper professional education.
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. See R.G. SwONS, S. KIEmw & R.L. SnmMONS, supra note 13, at 374-75.
192. Id.
193. TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 32.
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